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INTRODUCTION
When we think about state constitutions (as rarely as that might be
for most lawyers) and how they differ from the Federal Constitution,
most likely we consider how individual rights under state constitutions
can be protected above the federal floor. Typically, these questions arise
in the areas of criminal law and criminal procedure. For example, what
can be regulated as obscenity under the Federal First Amendment is
protected under the Constitution of New York,' and what is a permissible




Jeffrey Shaman, for example, has authored a thorough catalog of
these individual rights.
3 Robert F. Williams has published similar work
(emphasizing state constitutions' individual rights above the 
federal
floor), including in this volume.
4 And classic works in the field like
Jennifer Friesen's two-volume practitioner's guide follow along the same
lines.5
Relatedly, when we think about access to civil justice, we tend to
focus on private law: the torts, contracts, and property disputes that
adjust the relative power of people acting in the free market. Government
power can be oppressive, but so, too, can economic power. Workers and
consumers turn to the courts for protection from this private oppression.
The law, and its observers, largely treat these disputes as relevant to the
parties involved and little else. By contrast, public law, the constitutional
law that determines the relative power of institutions of government and
1. See People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 501 N.E.2d 556, 564-65 (N.Y. 1986); People ex rel.
Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 503 N.E.2d 492, 495 (N.Y. 1986).
2. See State v. Boland, 800 P.2d 1112, 1116-17 (Wash. 1990) (en banc).
3. See generally JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, EQUALITY AND LIBERTY IN THE GOLDEN 
AGE OF
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2008) (matching state constitutional rights with their federal
analogues and analyzing the differences under state interpretations).
4. See, e.g., ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS (2009)
[hereinafter WILLIAMS, AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS]; Robert F. 
Williams, State
Constitutional Protection of Civil Litigation, 70 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 921 (2018) [hereinafter
Williams, State Constitutional Protection] (describing civil litigation rights, such as 
the
right to a jury, that exceed Federal Constitutional protections).
5. See generally 1 JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
LITIGATING
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS, AND DEFENSES (4th ed. 2006) (emphasizing individual rights
under state constitutions, particularly in the areas of criminal law and criminal procedure).
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citizens' rights against that government, can sometimes be forgotten in
both legal and scholarly writing about civil justice.
But the focus of this paper is different. Instead of first-order
individual rights, here I will discuss second-order constitutional
structures that protect and enhance those rights. I refer to institutions,
not rights, and public law, not private law. In math, if individual rights
are the function, you would think of this paper as taking the integral; in
music, if rights are the melody, here is an account of the bass line. And
as with individual rights, state constitutions can and do vary in quite
meaningful ways from the Federal Constitution.
Some of these variations are themselves startling: for example, if the
three branches of government must include a legislature accountable to
the people and supreme in lawmaking, an executive accountable to the
people and supreme in executing the laws, and a judiciary independent
from the people but ultimately accountable to the other two branches,
then no state has three branches of government. The concept simply does
not fit (as we will see in detail below). So, the most important first step
in thinking about state constitutional structure is to open your mind to
the possibility (and even likelihood) of truly creative diversity in function
and form. What we teach in the law schools about federal constitutional
structure (typically the only kind of constitutional structure we teach), is
at best a loose analogy to the way things work in the states. And the
Federal Constitution itself leaves open this constitutional space for the
states to go their own weird ways.6
I. STATE CONSTITUTIONS ALLOCATE POWER AMONG GOVERNMENTAL
INSTITUTIONS DIFFERENTLY FROM THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
One of the foremost theoreticians in current state constitutional
studies, James A. Gardner, has described our American federal system
as a contest for affection.7 If the people trust the federal government
more, they can trust it with more powers by way of the constitutional
arrangement. And if the people trust their state governments more, they
6. See generally G. Alan Tarr, Explaining Sub-National Constitutional Space, 115
PENN. ST. L. REV. 1133 (2011) (examining the gap between federal and state powers as
established through each government's respective constitution).
7. See JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A JURISPRUDENCE
OF FUNCTION INA FEDERAL SYSTEM 18-20 (2005).
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can likewise bolster it with constitutional arrangements.
8 Given the
cultural/political difficulty in amending the Federal Constitution, the
more ordinary place to adjust these arrangements is in the state
constitutions.
A state with complex and deep limits on legislative procedure, or a
state with too many checks and balances among branches, will be unable
to pass much legislation, unable to implement policy, and 
therefore
unable to do much good (or harm) for the people. When the people of that
state seek help, they will turn to the government they like better, the
federal government. For a practical example, consider a state like Florida
with strong limits on its power to borrow money.
9 When a natural
disaster strikes, and the people of Florida need their homes rebuilt, their
infrastructure restored, and their environment rehabilitated, state
assistance would necessarily be inadequate because the state's budget
cannot accommodate the sudden massive expense while remaining
balanced. Instead, the people turn immediately to the federal
government for assistance from the Federal Emergency Management
Agency ("FEMA").10 After all, the federal government has proven itself
quite willing to borrow whatever amount it wants to satisfy its policy
preferences.11 Conversely, if the state government is structured without
impediments to policy-making, with a vigorous executive and an
unhampered legislature, it will fill the gaps left by a federal government
that lacks constitutional power to make or enforce the full range of
desirable policies. For example, a state like Massachusetts could adopt
far-reaching public health insurance ("Romneycare") without the
8. The third leg in the table of power is the private sphere. If the people handcuff
both their federal and state governments, they are necessarily empowering 
private
power-corporations. If the people fear oppression in their role as workers, consumers, 
and
small entrepreneurs, they must give some layer of government sufficient 
power to act
against the forces that threaten them in the private economy. If both the state and 
federal
governments are deprived of authority to regulate wage and hours, for example, 
then
private corporations are limited only by the market itself in terms of extracting 
the value
of labor from workers. See, e.g., Alan B. Krueger and Eric Posner, Opinion, Corporate
America Is Suppressing Wages for Many Americans, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/
2 0 18/02/28/opinion/corporate-america-suppressing-wages.html.
9. See FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (requiring a balanced budget); id. art. VII, § 11
(imposing restrictions on state bonds).
10. See Disaster Relief Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5208 (2018). For further
information regarding FEMA, see About the Agency, FEMA, https://www.fema.gov/about-
agency (last visited Sept. 9, 2018).
11. See Richard Briffault, Foreword: The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal Limits
and State Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 907 (2003) (discussing fiscal limitations
imposed upon federal and state governments by their respective constitutions).
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constitutional controversy2 that has dogged the Affordable Care Act
("Obamacare"). Maybe the state has the fiscal resources to carry out such
policies, or maybe it does not, but as a constitutional matter it has far
more room to maneuver than does the federal government.
What does all of this have to do with access to civil justice? As
important as the individual rights are, they mean nothing if they cannot
be implemented and protected. State constitutions create the institutions
that are capable of providing injured people a remedy, or not. And states
go about protecting these remedies through governmental structures
that might well seem bizarre from a federal perspective. Naturally, the
front line for protecting access to civil justice is the judiciary. And state
courts have a variety of powers that federal judges would gnash their
teeth in envy over.
For one thing, the scope of state courts' substantive authority is
greater than that of the federal courts. State courts make common law,
routinely and well; federal courts generally do not.13 Most state high
courts, with the assistance of other state judges, create the rules of
procedure and evidence for their states.14 The Federal Supreme Court
(after preliminary work by subordinate institutions of the judiciary)
produces a draft of procedure and evidence rules for the federal courts,
but it does so subject to Congress's power to reject the Court's rules and
only because Congress has delegated it that responsibilityls just as it
delegates the details of rulemaking for highway safety to the Department
of Transportation.16 State courts also regulate the bar, a crucial function
12. See, e.g., Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 536-38, 595 (2012)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in
part).
13. Compare Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (requiring the
application of state common law in federal diversity cases), with Exxon Shipping Co. v.
Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 483, 506 (2008) (making federal common law of admiralty by following
state practices and principles).
14. See Jack L. Landau, State Constitutionalism and the Limits of Judicial Power, 69
RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1309, 1321 n.76 (2017) (asserting that some thirty-eight state high
courts have constitutional authority to create rules of procedure). Connecticut, unusually,
seems to vest rulemaking power in the state trial courts, not the supreme court. See RULES
FOR THE SUPERIOR COURT §§ 1-9, 1-9B (COMM'N ON OFFICIAL LEGAL PUBL'NS 2018), in
CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK 103-04 (2018); Rules Committee of the Superior Court,
STATE OF CONNECTICUT JUDICIAL BRANCH, https://www.jud.ct.gov/Committees/rules/
default.htm#Members (last visited Sept. 12, 2018) (describing the rules committee as an
organ of the state trial court).
15. Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2018).
16. See 49 U.S.C. § 102 (2018).
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for determining whether the indigent, the marginalized, and the
unpopular will have access to law or not.1
7
Furthermore, unlike federal judges, most state judges have direct
democratic legitimacy in that they have stood for election and won. As
Professor Helen Hershkoff has explained, state judges' closer connection
to the people, via the ballot box, should lead them to feel empowered to
carry out their duties unapologetically and with gusto.
18 Federal judges
just do not think about courts as having democratic legitimacy; even
Justice O'Connor, a famous proponent of states' rights, has written of the
"representative branches" when she meant the political branches.
19
Thirty-eight states elect their judiciary, in one way or another.
20 State
judges, by and large, know the same rubber-chicken circuit that state
senators know; they know the party bosses, the community organizers,
and the out-of-state donors.
21 Whether or not judicial elections are wise
policy, they at least mean that state judges need not worry that 
their
"activism" is unaccountable or undemocratic.
22
Another feature of state constitutions is more uncomfortable to
discuss, but cannot be avoided. To understand it requires a bit of
background. As we all know, the federal government is one of enumerated
powers. Whatever shenanigans the Commerce Clause and the Spending
Clause have gotten up to lately, it remains irrevocably correct that
each and every federal action-whether legislative, executive, or
judicial-must have some origin in Constitutional text. If a letter carrier
steps onto your porch to deliver mail, it is because her supervisor
assigned that route. The supervisor's power to assign the route comes
from a guidance manual, which in turn derives its authority from duly
promulgated Post Office regulations.
23 Those regulations are authorized
by statute, and Article I, Clause 8 of the Constitution empowers Congress
to pass the statute.
24
17. Thomas M. Alpert, The Inherent Power of the Courts to Regulate the Practice of Law:
An Historical Analysis, 32 BUFF. L. REV. 525, 525 (1983).
18. See Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues": Rethinking the
Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1887 (2001) ("[S]tate trial judges ... enjoyfj a
greater aura of democratic accountability.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
19. See Justin R. Long, Comment, Enforcing Affirmative State Constitutional
Obligations and Sheff v. O'Neill, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 277, 299 (2002) (citing Missouri 
v.
Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 112 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
20. See Jonathan L. Marshfield, Foreign Precedent in State Constitutional
Interpretation, 53 DUQ. L. REV. 413, 432 (2015).
21. See, e.g., MICH. JUDICIAL SELECTION TASK FORCE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5 (2012), http://www.mcfn.org/uploads/documents/MIJudicialSelectionTaskForce.pdf.
22. See Hershkoff, supra note 18.
23. See 39 C.F.R. §§ 111.1-111.5 (2005).
24. See US. CONST. art. I, § 8; 39 U.S.C. §§ 501-503 (2018).
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But state governments are different. As a matter of constitutional
theory, states-not the federal government-are the inheritors of the
sovereignty enjoyed by medieval English kings.25 That means that state
legislatures have plenary power. They can pass any statute they wish,
.limited only where federal law or the state constitution prohibits their
action. And the state governor, too, has plenary power in her proper
sphere, subject only to the limitations imposed by federal law and the
state constitution.
State courts? The same. They hold the same sovereign powers as the
King's courts, restrained only by superior sources of law and the
prerogatives of the other branches. If that seems odd, consider under
what authority the common law exists. An injured person comes to court;
she asks the court to compel the injurer to make her whole. With no basis
in text and no express grant of power, the court decides whether the
injury complained of can be redressed in law or not-even if that
particular wrong has never been so much as imagined by the courts
before.26 In other words, the state courts have power unless some other
source of law takes it from them.
When we see state constitutional provisions directed at the
legislature, then, we are seeing the expression in law of the people's wish
to constrain the legislature, not empower it. If the people wish to permit
their state legislature to make law in any given area, they need do
nothing. The default, unlike in the federal context, is that the power to
act exists. By writing a legislature-directed clause into the constitution,
then, the people express, at root, a lack of confidence in their elected
legislators. Sadly, history offers many examples to justify such lack of
faith.27 State democratic processes have often resulted in "capture" of the
legislature by special interests, to disastrous effect. The people have
responded by writing state constitutions that reflect an intent to
implement checks on a non-majoritarian legislature.28
These checks take a variety of forms, but the three most important
are: subject matter exclusions, where the legislature is barred from
acting on specified topics; procedural limitations, where the legislature
is burdened with super-majority rules or other constraints on the
lawmaking process (a method entirely absent from the Federal
25. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 765-66, 765 n.4, 772, (1999) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
26. See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (validating the
legitimacy as "law" of state judge-made law in the absence of superseding statutes).
27. See, e.g., Justin R. Long, State Constitutional Prohibitions on Special Laws, 60
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 719, 727-28 (2012).
28. Cf. League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 181 A.3d 1083,
1084 (2018).
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Constitution apart from the basic requirement of bicameralism); and the
empowerment of other state institutions to act against the legislature
when appropriate. This third form of restraint, in turn, manifests in
complex ways. For example, strong state constitutional protection 
for the
powers of localities are one way a legislature must contend with, and
even concede to, other state institutions.
29
State constitutional grants of authority to state agencies are another
means of weakening the legislature and forcing it to make deals with
other institutions rather than set policy unilaterally. For example, in my
state of Michigan, the three leading state universities are governed by
independently elected boards-and the boards' authority over university
policy exceeds that of the legislature.
30 The legislature can use its power
of the purse to affect university policy indirectly, but ultimate authority
remains with the elected boards.
31 Of course, by far the most influential
check on the legislature is the judiciary.
Courts in every state exercise ordinary judicial review of statutes,
seemingly just as the federal courts do. But the reasons for state court
review are fundamentally different. Judicial review in the states occurs
against the background described above: judges using their own
democratic legitimacy instead of isolating independence; the assumption
of power except where prohibited instead of exclusively where that power
has been enumerated; and a deep, durable, and justified constitutional
suspicion of the legislature.
32 In that context, state judicial review can
often be majoritarian. When the legislature has passed anti-majoritarian
statutes because of special lobbying by powerful but not numerous elites
(like the medical associations),
33 or has infringed the powers of other
state institutions with their own democratic authority, or has violated
constitutional procedural restraints with a wink and a nod, the state
courts stand empowered to strike down the legislation in the name of the
people.
34
The vigor, or lack thereof, with which the courts carry out this
function directly affects injured parties' ability to win some form of
justice, both against state officials and against private forces. After all, it
29. See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 29 (requiring the state to reimburse local
governments for costs derived from state-imposed mandates).
30. Id. art. VIII, § 3.
31. See id.
32. See generally Anthony Schutz, State Constitutional Restrictions on Special
Legislation as Structural Restraints, 40 J. LEGIS. 39, 56 (2013-2014); Michael L. Buenger,
Friction by Design: The Necessary Contest of State Judicial Power and Legislative Policy
making, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 571 (2008).
33. See Schutz, supra note 32, at 44-45, 54-55.
34. Id.
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is private forces-the economic elites that set terms of employment,
compel consumer contracts of adhesion, and "speak" to the legislature
with their dollarS35-that will rush to fill the power void if state courts
do not.
II. STRUCTURAL ARRANGEMENTS INTIMATELY AFFECT ACCESS TO CIVIL
JUSTICE
A. As Every Litigator Knows, Who Decides Often Matters Just as Much
(or More) as How They Decide
The layer of government responsible for a particular issue will have,
in many circumstances, a dispositive effect on how the issue gets
resolved. For example, if air pollution is left to local governments to solve,
there will be a race to the bottom and we will all live in smog. On the
other hand, if the federal government has adequate power and
responsibility to address air pollution, it can take great strides to protect
public health.36 If financing schools is left to local governments, there will
be enormous inequality of opportunity as rich towns buy high quality
schools while poor towns look on in grief and frustration. On the other
hand, if states and the federal government assume primary
responsibility for financing schools, adequate and uniform resources for
public education become possible, if not likely.37
Which branch of government bears primary responsibility for a
particular issue can also determine the outcome. Legal economists point
out that tort damages, all else being equal, are no different from an
administrative fine or a legislative tax, at least from the perspective of a
profit-driven firm.38 But all else is not equal. Administrative agencies
have the resources, expertise, and inclination to send out inspectors
across the land, actively seeking safety violations. The tort system must
wait for the plaintiff who is injured gravely enough for litigation to be
cost-effective and who has the personal temperament and capacity to
seek a remedy in court. And the legislature can hold hearings, debate,
and study research that brings forward perspectives from all sides before
fixing a preventative tax on unsafe activities, while the tort system must
35. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 329, 372 (2010).
36. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.SC. § 7401 (2018).
37. Cf. Justin R. Long, Democratic Education and Local School Governance, 50
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 401, 425-26 (2014).
38. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972)
(explaining how the tort system functions like regulation because it allocates costs to
parties for their economic activity).
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rely on the parties before it for information and typically 
must treat
arguments not raised as waived. For a concrete example of 
who decides
making a difference, consider family law: historically, state legislatures
were responsible for granting divorces, but today courts fill that
role and divorces have become much easier to get as a result.
39
Even within the judiciary, the level of court with responsibility for an
issue can have outsized effects on the results. The level of deference
appellate courts pay to fact-finding by the trial court substantially 
affects
whether losing litigants will be able to take a second bite at the apple
(without a jury) or not. In New York, for example, the appellate 
division
of the state supreme court has far greater power to review fact-finding
than in many other states.
40 The willingness of a state high court to
correct inconsistent lines of appellate precedent
41 determines whether
litigants will be able to exploit competing precedents to effectively throw
the matter to the personal ideology of the judges, where the advocates'
and parties' relative power outside of court (as important firms 
in the
local economy, politically connected firms, or the like) can sometimes
influence judges, consciously or unconsciously.
4 2
Unresolved inconsistencies lead to throat-clearing platitudes; as I
teach my education law students, every student free-speech case must
include the line "Students do not lose their constitutional rights at the
schoolhouse door" and this line must be followed by some variety of "But
schools may restrict those rights to protect the educational
environment."43 The pointless repetition of these lines does nothing to
advance doctrine or explain the result to the litigants and lower courts,
but does reveal how the Federal Supreme Court has not taken enough of
these cases for its precedents to be determinative in a wide array of
common circumstances.
The result is that lower courts have more room to decide cases based
on reasons other than the United States Supreme Court's conclusive
39. See Schutz, supra note 32, at 62-63.
40. Jill Paradise Botler et al., The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York:
An Empirical Study of Its Powers and Functions as an Intermediate State Court, 
47
FORDHAM L. REV. 929, 930 (1979).
41. See, e.g., Michael J. Yetter, Note, Gutierrez v. Smith, A Curious Case of Depraved
Indifference Murder, 77 ALB. L. REV. 1201, 1201-02 (2014) (describing 
conflicting lines of
precedent in New York's depraved-indifference murder doctrine).
42. See. e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (describing the
influence, perceived or real, of a coal baron on the West Virginia Supreme Court 
in a case
where his company was a party).
43. See, e.g., Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison Sch. Corp., 212 F.3d 1052, 1063 
(7th Cir.
2000) (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 
(1969))
("[Situdents have a lesser expectation of privacy than the general public. 
However, students
do not shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse door.").
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interpretation of law. And any supreme court's response to lower courts
that comply with precedent less than enthusiastically can have, and has
had, major effects on the substance of the law. For example, after many
lower federal courts began tightening pleading requirements in apparent
contravention of the liberal standard articulated in Conley v. Gibson,44
the Federal Supreme Court responded not by slapping down the errant
courts, but by adopting their unauthorized "reforms" as its own in Iqbal.45
Similarly, the Federal Court in Pearson46 explicitly cited lower courts
that were out of compliance with its precedent in Saucier,47 which
required them to consider qualified immunity claims in an order that
would preserve the plaintiffs right to have the challenged conduct
declared unlawful or not. Even though the lower courts had no authority
to disregard binding, clear, and effective law from the Supreme Court,
their path was treated by the Court as evidence that its precedent was
not working, and the Court then adopted the approach of the rebellious
circuits.48 On the other hand, when some federal circuits were expanding
non-mutual claim preclusion beyond previously expressed boundaries,
the Federal Supreme Court corrected them sharply in Taylor.49 In this
way, even when it comes to the law-announcing function, power can flow
back and forth between high courts (which, formally, have the exclusive
authority to set a conclusive interpretation) and the lower courts (which
must implement the jurisprudence and may do so with more or less
enthusiasm).
The geographic boundaries of judicial authority and judicial
financing also affect how the law shapes access to justice. Geographic
jurisdiction, which is limited by more than just venue and long-arm
statutes, can funnel the most vulnerable members of society to the most
underfunded and overworked courts. If state courts are funded by local
units of government like counties, the misalignment between resources
and function can sometimes lead to underfunding the judiciary--such as
by denying judges sufficient support staff, sufficient office space, or
sometimes even adequate courtrooms--in ways that expand dockets,
rush decisions, and impugn the dignity of the courts.50
Perhaps worse, relying on the poorest localities to fund their courts
often means that the poorest citizens are served by courts that cannot
44. 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957).
45. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009).
46. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 234-36 (2009).
47. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-01 (2001).
48. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 234-36.
49. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 895-96 (2008).
50. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 274 A.2d 193 (1971) (describing a
municipality's underfunding of a state court).
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provide the justice their richer neighbors enjoy. Furthermore, if judges
are elected or selected from local or regional districts instead of
statewide, opportunities for forum-shopping increase as the differing
characteristics of different areas of the state manifest themselves on the
bench-and states exhibit greater internal political variation than they
do compared to each other (just think about how Austin is much more
like Boston than it is like the exurban areas around Dallas, and rural
Maine is much more like rural West Virginia than it is like Portland).
51
And, as is commonly acknowledged, the differing geographic cachements
from which judges are assigned and jury pools are drawn can yield
extraordinary differences in the ability of plaintiffs, in particular, to file
their complaints in a fair forum.
52
The layer of government, the branch of government, the level within
the judiciary, and the geographic jurisdiction all work to strengthen 
or
weaken a court's power to offer adequate remedies for legal wrongs. Legal
procedure also affects how these institutional arrangements allocate
power. For example, some state courts have identified parts of their
constitution as "hortatory" or "precatory," euphemisms for "toothless."
53
Even among judges who would find shocking and unacceptable any
suggestion that the Federal Constitution contains inconsistencies and
superfluities, there seems to be a widespread willingness to treat duly
ratified elements of state constitutions as unenforceable. For example, in
Pennsylvania, a quite direct and strong clause protecting environmental,
historical, and aesthetic values was held unenforceable, even by the state
Attorney General (who, as an elected official, has ample non-legal
incentive to avoid over enforcing the clause).
54 The first step against this
tendency, then, is to accept that the people have placed clauses in their
state constitutions purposefully (even if they seem obstructionist or
hampering the legislature!) to solve historically contingent social
problems, and expect the courts to stand firm in enforcing every last
word.
51. See, e.g., Matthew Bloch et al., An Extremely Detailed Map of the 2016 Election,
N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.comlinteractive/2018/upshot/election-
20 16-voting-precinct-maps.html.
52. See, e.g., Republic of Bolivia v. Philip Morris Cos., 39 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1009-10
(S.D. Tex. 1999) (Kent, J.) (mocking plaintiffs for filing in the Southern District of Texas).
53. See, e.g., Mandel v. O'Hara, 576 A.2d 766, 780 (Md. 1990) (referring to article 
6 of
the Maryland Declaration of Rights as "precatory" and so inapplicable); Claremont Sch.
Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375, 1377 (N.H. 1993) (referring to the trial court's order
indicating the state's education clause is "hortatory" and not enforceable).
54. Commonwealth v. Nat'l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 311 A.2d 588, 594-95
(Pa. 1973).
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B. Rights Without an Institution Capable of Enforcing Them Are
Commonly Violated
To accomplish the courts' duty to the people to preserve the rule of
law, a private cause of action is necessary. Sometimes state courts have
followed (often without much introspection) the federal practice of
acknowledging the existence of a right but leaving enforcement to
government officials. For example, in federal law, there is no private
cause of action for damages to challenge conditions of immigration
detention, even though there is formally a "right" to be free of
unconstitutional conditions of confinement.55 Factors in support of this
practice at the federal level typically include federalism, deference to the
elected branches, national security concerns, and a general antipathy to
judge-made law.56
But not one of these rationales apply at the state level. State courts
are common-law courts, and routinely make law where justice and sound
policy call for it.5 And state judges are mostly elected-meaning that the
courts themselves are an elected branch-which gives that common-law
making function democratic legitimacy. Federalism favors decentralizing
decision-making down to the states; it does not favor states abdicating
the problem-solving capacity properly devolved to them. So the federal
skepticism about judicially created causes of action is simply misplaced
at the state level. Access to justice requires private parties to have their
grievances heard and remedied in the courts, even in the absence of
legislation to that effect.
Furthermore, for civil wrongdoers to face justice, the courts must
grant standing liberally. The federal standing doctrine is complex and
restrictive. But as with the recognition of private causes of action, the
reasons behind the federal approach to standing largely do not apply
in state courts. For a start, every state has a court of general
jurisdiction-unlike any federal court. Exercising general jurisdiction
over all comers eliminates the need for the parsimony we see in federal
standing doctrine. Many similar factors, carefully and comprehensively
articulated by Helen Hershkoff, point state doctrine toward opening the
courts to plaintiffs who would not satisfy federal requirements.58 Since
many social problems, such as climate change, affect a wide array of
people but not any one person with provable severity, standing obstacles
55. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1854, 1860 (2017).
56. See id. at 1860-61.
57. See, e.g., Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (1928) (defining tort liability
in a novel way).
58. Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal
Rationality Review, 112 HARv. L. REV. 1131, 1156 (1999).
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can exclude the courts from doing their share to right wrongs. This is a
structural defect that states are well-positioned to correct.
Once the state courts recognize a private cause of action and a
plaintiff with standing to pursue it, the courts must assert for themselves
the power to remedy the legal violation for access to justice 
to be
meaningful. Particularly in cases implicating the other branches of
government, state courts have often recoiled from a full-bore remedial
effort. For example, in education law, state courts have identified
constitutional violations in one of our most important communal
obligations only to then offer no more than a tepid admonition to the
political branches.
5 9
Courts that have more assertively exercised their authority to
remedy wrongs have seen greater success.
60 In New Jersey, the supreme
court has heard the same education-equity case nearly two dozen
times, demonstrating its unwillingness to let repeated legislative
non-compliance wear the court down into impotence.
61 In Massachusetts,
when the legislature refused to follow a court order to appropriate
money for a public finance fund for political campaigns, the state high
court authorized a single justice to enforce the decree. She did so by
selling state surplus at a judicial auction; compliance quickly followed.
62
Whether a reluctance to pursue assertive remedies is understood as a
matter of doctrine or culture, procedure or structure, it remains a
substantial chokepoint for access to justice even where a substantive
right and appropriate procedures exist to protect it.
III. STATE HIGH COURTS HAVE CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO MAKE
RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EvIDENCE
One way state constitutions allocate lawmaking authority would
seem exceedingly strange to a federal observer: they allocate it to the
courts.63 Most state high courts have the authority-whether granted
59. See, e.g., Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1289-90 (Conn. 1996).
60. See generally Helen Hershkoff, "Just Words": Common Law and the Enforcement of
State Constitutional Social and Economic Rights, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1521, 1551 (2010)
(describing how some courts have crafted effective remedies).
61. See The History of Abbott v. Burke, EDUC. L. CTR., http://www.edlawcenter.org/
litigation/abbott-v-burke/abbott-history.html (last visited May 31, 2018).
62. See Long, supra note 19, at 300, 302 n.155.
63. See, e.g., Helen Hershkoff, The Michigan Constitution, Judicial Rulemaking, and
Erie-Effects on State Governance, 60 WAYNE L. REV. 117, 118 (2014).
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expressly by constitutional text64 or implied by inherent powers6 5-to
make rules of civil procedure and evidence.66 This is decidedly not the
power that the Federal Supreme Court has to promulgate the Federal
Rules, which is nothing more than an agency's power to make regulations
under authority delegated from Congress and subject to Congress's
approval.67 Some state constitutions have taken this power from the
courts and granted it to the legislature,68 while others have acceded to
the courts' power but modified it with concurrent or superseding
legislative authority.69 But for most courts, the supreme lawmaking
authority with respect to rules of procedure is the high court itself,70
sometimes even in the face of contrary statutes.71
This basic constitutional principle-that the judiciary should make
its own rules, just as the houses of the legislature make their
own rules-might seem a mite abstruse.72 Constitutional
separation-of-powers arguments already veer toward the theoretical, and
constitutional separation-of-powers arguments about civil procedure are
even more unlikely to grip the crowds at a summer barbecue. But as the
many examples I discuss below demonstrate, these superficially abstract,
structural disputes can have profound effects on the workaday world of
the civil litigator, and therefore on the ability of the unjustly injured to
obtain redress. Those who make the rules can determine the outcome.
The foundational case in this area comes from New Jersey.73 John
Winberry sued a clerk of court asserting that a grand jury report lodged
against him was libel.74 The trial court held there was no cause of action
64. See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 5; Jason Bologna, Comment, An Abuse of Power:
How the Pennsylvania Supreme Court Uses Article V, Section 10(C) of the Pennsylvania
Constitution to Dominate Procedural Lawmaking, and Why Pennsylvania Should Amend
this Constitutional Provision, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 711, 712 n.9 (1998); Kent R. Hart, Note,
Court Rulemaking in Utah Following the 1985 Revision of the Utah Constitution, 1992
UTAH L. REV. 153, 161 (1992).
65. See, e.g., ILL. SUP. CT. R. 3 (describing court's power to promulgate rules of
procedure without reference to constitutional support).
66. See generally WILIAMS, AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 4, at 291-92.
67. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1941).
68. E.g., IOWA CONST. art. V, § 14 (assigning the legislature authority over civil
procedure).
69. E.g., VA. CONST. art. VI, § 5 (declaring that court-made rules of procedure shall not
conflict with statutes).
70. With the exception of Connecticut, where a committee of trial court judges (albeit
chaired by a supreme court justice, presumably so the trial judges do not get out of hand)
crafts the rules. See RULES FOR THE SUPERIOR COURT, supra note 14.
71. See WILLIAMS, AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 4, at 291-92.
72. See John H. Wigmore, Editorial Note, All Legislative Rules for Judiciary Procedure
Are Void Constitutionally, 23 ILL. L. REV. 276, 277 (1929).
73. Winberry v. Salisbury, 74 A.2d 406 (N.J. 1950).
74. Id. at 407.
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and dismissed, so Winberry appealed-but with a catch. According to a
state statute, Winberry had a year from the final judgment to file his
appeal, and he filed just over two months after the judgment. But the
rule promulgated by the state supreme court gave only 45 days to file an
appeal.75 So whether Winberry could get an appellate court to review 
the
merits or not turned on whether the court rule or the statute would
control. The New Jersey Supreme Court pointed out that the tradition of
court-made rules of procedure extended back to ancient English practice,
a tradition near-universally picked up in the colonies and carried forward
in the new states.76 The court noted that this type of rule-making is
unmistakably a kind of legislation-there could be no hiding that-but
found:
Too many people think of the Legislature as a body that has as
its sole function the making of laws for the future, the Governor
as a chief executive who merely enforces the law, and the courts
as having power only to decide cases and controversies. While
these notions are true so far as they go, they are quite insufficient
to explain the complicated operations of the three great branches
of government, either historically or analytically. Thus, while the
primary function of the courts is to decide cases and controversies
properly brought before them, the Legislature also has the power
to adjudicate as to the qualifications of its members, their
deportment while in office, as well as in impeachment
proceedings on the misdemeanors of all state officers, and the
Governor has the right to try any officer or employee in the
Executive Department on charges after notice and an
opportunity to be heard, and a host of controversies are decided
in administrative tribunals which are not courts but which are
located in the Executive Branch of the government. Thus,
adjudication is not exclusively a judicial function. ... Not only
are these seeming exceptions to an over-simplified statement of
the doctrine of separation of powers necessary as a matter of logic
and analysis of governmental activities, but they have centuries
of historical justification.
77
The court refused to be bound by formalist (and inaccurate) limitations
of strict separation of powers. Instead, the court carried out an extensive
analysis of the then three-year-old state constitution's text and
75. Id. at 408.
76. Id. at 412-13.
77. Id. at 412 (citation omitted).
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legislative history to conclude that the court's own rules would, indeed,
trump the legislature's statutes, but only where the rules were
procedural rather than substantive.78 There being no dispute about the
procedural element of the timing for appeals, the court ruled Winberry's
appeal untimely.79
Among the policy reasons the Winberry court found in support of its
constitutional authority was the interest in uniformity obtained by the
dominance of a single institution in the field (as opposed to pluralist
procedure made by different branches at different times), and even more
importantly, a dedication of the task to the institution most expert in the
subject. After all, the court reasoned, who knows better than judges what
the rules of procedure ought to be?80
Neither of these policy rationales impressed the justices of the
Michigan Supreme Court in 1999 when they decided the case of
McDougall v. Schanz.81 As the result of an intensive lobbying campaign
by the state medical association and insurance carriers, the
Michigan legislature adopted a package of statutes aimed at "tort
reform"-particularly limiting medical malpractice liability.82 Among
those new statutes was a provision imposing heightened requirements
for testifying physicians to be qualified as expert (and therefore
permitted to testify as to the standard of care).83 This legislation
conflicted directly with the aims of a plaintiff suing a group of doctors
who failed to diagnose his wife's diabetes, which caused her death.84 He
wanted to put an expert on the stand who did not meet the new
requirements.85 But the plaintiff figured that he had a good shot at
getting the testimony admitted, because a Michigan Rule of Court plainly
and explicitly permitted a doctor with the proffered witness's
qualifications to be placed in front of the jury.86 The case made its way to
the supreme court for resolution of the question the New Jersey court
answered in Winberry: Does the statute or the court rule prevail?87
78. Id. at 412-14.
79. Id. at 414.
80. Id. at 413.
81. 597 N.W.2d. 148, 157-58, (Mich. 1999); id. at 167 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting).
82. See Steve Carmody, State Lawmakers Look at Tightening Michigan's Medical
Malpractice Laws, MICH. RADIO (June 11, 2012), http://www.michiganradio.org/post/state-
lawmakers-look-tightening- michigans- medical- malpractice-laws (describing the "major"
tort reform process in Michigan in the 1990s).
83. McDougall, 597 N.W.2d at 151, 153 n.9 (citing MICH. COMP. LAws § 600.2169
(1993)).
84. Id. at 150-51.
85. Id. at 151-52.
86. See id. at 152-53 (citing MICH. R. EVID. 702).
87. Id. at 153-54.
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In McDougall, the majority (a group of justices ideologically
sympathetic to, and politically aligned with, the proponents 
of "tort
reform") held, quite vigorously, that rules do indeed trump statutes
where they conflict-but only when those court-made rules are truly
procedural, or as the court put it, affect the "mere dispatch of 
judicial
business."8 8 Where there is any legislative policy other than court
administration underlying a statute, the court rule is no longer
procedural and can be superseded by statute.
89 The court did not discuss
the fact that no legislature anywhere would ever pass a statute that was
only motivated by concern for the dispatch of judicial business. Voters 
do
not flock to the polls to support their favorite representative's stance on
the font size of legal briefs. Any bill sufficient to garner a majority of two
houses' worth of legislators would need some rationale that would affect
the public, something to satisfy an interest group or win favor from a
constituency. And the constituency of people who vote based on policies
affecting the "mere" administration of justice without any effect on people
outside the courts (court clerks? legal printers? stenographers?) is just
too tiny to support the passage of legislation.
90 Thus, in the McDougall
case itself, the court concluded that the statute fixing the qualifications
of an expert witness was not simply a matter of evidentiary law, but was
motivated by the legislature's broader public policy push to limit tort
liability.9 1 And, presumably, there will never again be a court rule that
trumps a statute in Michigan.
The separation-of-powers dispute in McDougall had a major effect on
the plaintiffs effort to hold his wife's doctors accountable for her death.
92
But more broadly, that decision changed the battleground for how to win
fair rules of procedure. While the supreme court was responsible for
procedure (and evidence), citizens seeking a change in the rules could
present their claims to the court-by definition, a group of experienced
and savvy former lawyers-at rule-making hearings.
93 But they could
88. Id. at 156, 158-59.
89. Id. at 158.
90. Even trial lawyers would be unlikely to spend lobbying efforts on procedural rules
unless they had an effect on public policy, such as the ability for injured parties to recover
compensation.
91. See McDougall, 597 N.W.2d at 158-59.
92. Id. at 159.
93. See Administrative Order No. 1997-11, 456 Mich. clxxviii (1997-1998); see also
Admin Matters & Court Rules, Public Administrative Hearings, MICH. CTS. (last visited
Oct. 31, 2018), https://courts.michigan.gov/Courts/MichigansupremeCourt/rules/Pages/
Public-Administrative-Hearings.aspx.
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also seek procedural change by way of litigation,94 or by a democratic
campaign. Michigan justices, like most state high court judges, are
elected.95
All of these approaches strongly favor lawyers, the people who know
and care about the judiciary's internal politics and who work daily in the
cauldron of the courts. These methods of accountability and change make
surprise lurches in one direction or another unlikely and assure that
experts in law have the most influence on policy within their ambit of
expertise. By contrast, the crafting of civil procedure in the legislature
subjects the courts to rules that swing from one political pole to the other
as partisan majorities cycle through the statehouse. And the kinds of
voices that get privileged in the legislature are different from those with
influence in the judiciary. Lobbying by special-interest groups with no
real knowledge of or belief in the fundamental principles of civil justice,
or even rule of law, can (and often does) prevail over the measured voice
of the experienced bar. Changes can be piecemeal without thought for
their effect on the overall litigation experience. And high-visibility or
controversial questions get disproportionate attention while important
but "technical" issues are left unexamined.
In another personal injury case that turned out to really be about
separation of powers, Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, the Illinois
Supreme Court confronted a state statute setting caps on non-economic
(but still compensatory) damages, specifically in medical malpractice
cases.96 There was no court rule in open conflict with the statute.97 But
after a comprehensive review of why plaintiffs are entitled to damages,
how that entitlement can vary from case to case, and how the courts had
always operated to apply rationality to damages awards through the
procedure of remittitur, the supreme court concluded that the statute
was a legislative encroachment on the powers constitutionally vested in
the judiciary.98 Therefore, the caps were invalidated on state
constitutional separation-of-powers grounds.99
In Ohio, "a power struggle between those who seek to limit their
liability and financial exposure for civil wrongs and those who seek
94. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 667-79 (2009) (changing the settled
meaning of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by case law rather than through
the rule-amendment process).
95. MICH. COMP. LAwS ANN. §§ 168.391-168.467 (West 2018).
96. 930 N.E.2d 895, 899 (111. 2010).
97. See id. at 902.
98. Id. at 905-08.
99.' Id. at 914.
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compensation for their injuries" roiled the state.
100 After the legislature
passed a statute that, among other things, required plaintiffs to obtain 
a
"certificate of merit" in medical malpractice cases before their action
could go forward, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that the requirement
violated the state civil rules, which contained no such obstacle.
10 1 In an
opinion that can only be described as heated, the supreme court
reiterated its well-established understanding of the state constitution's
explicit grant of rulemaking authority to the judiciary. While the court
could not make substantive law in the guise of procedural rules, where
its rules were procedural no statute could supersede them.
102 Thus,
again, a highly political and practical fight about how far the law should
go to provide a remedy for people injured by medical professionals was
transformed into a structural dispute about separation of powers. And it
was on that battlefield-the historical, philosophical grounds on which
the constitution allocated power among government institutions-that
the healthcare policy dispute and the injured parties' entitlement to relief
were finally determined.
103
It is worth remembering, in thinking about cases like Winberry,
Lebron, and Ohio Trial Lawyers, that these cases could not possibly have
come out the way they did under federal constitutional doctrine. The
Rules Enabling Act,104 by which Congress delegated its power over the
lower federal courts to the Supreme Court for the development of
procedural rules (but retained the last word by requiring proposals to
come back to Congress before taking effect), is "undoubted[1y]"
constitutional.10 5 The United States Supreme Court, presented with the
question of whether an act of Congress must yield to a contrary rule,
would find the matter farcical if not sanctionable. As a result, the fight
over procedure-the rules of the game that can be fair or fixed, and that
determine, in so many cases, who wins and who loses-must ultimately
be carried out in the political branches at the federal level. That the
states, broadly, have made the opposite choice goes to the heart of our
federalist system. There is no one way of doing something in American
democracy. Groups that struggle to be heard over the din in the lobbies
of legislatures might find a more receptive forum in the judiciary; groups
ill-equipped to seek change in the courts might find greater access in the
capitols. The big questions our society argues over might be the same in
100. State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1071 (Ohio
1999).
101. Id. at 1087.
102. Id. at 1087-88.
103. Id. at 1096-97, 1111.
104. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2018).
105. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1941).
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the judiciary as it is in the other branches of government, and their
political connotations might also transcend institutions; some judges lean
one way, some lean the other, just as some politicians do. But the way we
carry out that large, important social conflict matters enormously to
what result we get.
IV. STATE HIGH COURTS HAVE CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO
REGULATE THE BAR
For ordinary people, especially including the indigent or otherwise
vulnerable, access to justice is crucial because it puts the power of the
state on their side against the economic elites who oppress them in the
marketplace. If the courts lack power-if the judges are demoralized, the
dockets are overcrowded, and competent attorneys will not accept judicial
appointments-then the courts cannot protect the injured and
downtrodden. Again, state constitutional structures bear on access to
justice in profound and practical ways.
In addition to deciding the rules by which cases go through court,
state high courts decide who may argue those cases. Access to civil justice
is not commonly linked to state policy about bar admissions. Instead, we
see two large-scale debates presented as if they were unrelated. On the
one hand, post-Great Recession changes in the legal services market
caused law school enrollment to plummet. To keep up their revenue,
many schools admitted students with low LSAT scores, which correlated
with low bar passage (and also with the race and class of the admitted
students).106 As legal jobs disappeared, vituperative anti-law school
rhetoric from popular websites like Above the Lawo7 and even the New
106. See generally Christian C. Day, Law Schools Can Solve the "Bar Pass
Problem"_'Do the Work!", 40 CAL. W. L. REV. 321, 326-30 (2004) (demonstrating the link
between LSAT scores and bar passage rates). See also Elizabeth Olson, Law Schools Debate
a Contentious Testing Alternative, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/04/05/education/earning/1sat-law-school-testing-alternative.html (noting that LSAT
scores are correlated with race and other identity factors); Elizabeth Olson, Harvard Law,
Moving to Diversify Applicant Pool, Will Accept GRE Scores, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/0 3/08/business/dealbook/harvard-law-will-accept-gre-
scores.html (noting that Harvard Law School joined University of Arizona James E. Rogers
College of Law in accepting GRE scores for admission).
107. See, e.g., Shannon Achimalbe, 4 Types of People Who Shouldn't Go to Law School,
ABOVE THE LAW (July 15, 2015, 10:02 AM), https://abovethelaw.com/2015/07/4-types-of-
people-who-shouldn't-go-to-law-school; David Lat, Dear 16- Year Old Me, Don't Go to Law
School, ABOVE THE LAW (Feb. 29, 2012, 7:02 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2012/02/dear-
1 6 -year-old-me-dont-go-to-law-school/; Joe Patrice, Deciding to Go to Law School Is One
Epic Flowchart, ABOVE THE LAW (Oct. 3, 2013, 5:13 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2013/10/
deciding-to-go-to-law-school-in-one-epic-flowchart.
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York Times0 poisoned the common conception of lawyering's economic,
social, and moral value. In particular, critics attacked law schools with
low bar passage rates on the ground that students' expensive educational
loans could never be repaid without access to a legal career.
109 Even the
president of the National. Conference of Bar Examiners blamed law
schools for the historically low bar passage rates.
110
On the other hand, the unmet needs of indigent clients across the
country continue at a heartbreaking scale. Long-time homeowners facing
foreclosure find themselves outgunned in mortgage proceedings by the
banks' greater access to savvy lawyers;
111 public benefits recipients face
new and complex requirements without affordable representation;
112 and
arbitration clauses and anti-class action initiatives leave workers alone,
vulnerable, and in need of advocates.
113
108. See, e.g., David Segal, Is Law School a Losing Game?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/
2 011/01/09/business/09law.html (discussing criticisms of law
schools, such as high tuition, self-reported post-graduation employment statistics, 
and the
importance placed on the U.S. News rankings); see also Lawrence E. Mitchell, Opinion, Law
School is Worth the Money, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
2 012/11/29/opinion/law-school-is-worth-the-money.html (referring 
to attacks on legal
education); Noam Scheiber, An Expensive Law Degree, and No Place to Use 
It, N.Y. Times
(June 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/19/business/dealbook/an-expensive-law-
degree-and-no-place-to-use-it.html (discussing the decrease in job prospects and mounting
debt for law students).
109. See, e.g., Steven Davidoff Solomon, Law School a Solid Investment, Despite Pay
Discrepancies, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/22/business/
dealbookllaw-school-a-solid-investment-despite-pay-discrepancies.html (describing the
popular, but largely mistaken, view that the vast majority of law schools 
would not produce
enough high-paying jobs for students to repay their loans).
110. See Carol Goforth, Why the Bar Examination Fails to Raise the Bar, 42 OHIO N.U.
L. REV. 47, 47 (2015); Elizabeth Olson, Not Only Elite Law Schools Offer Great Return 
on
Investment, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/24/business/
dealbook/law-school-debt-salary.html.
111. See, e.g., Eric A. Zacks & Dustin A. Zacks, Not a Party: Challenging Mortgage
Assignments, 59 ST. LoUIs U. L.J. 175 (2014) (describing how banks, as sophisticated repeat
litigators, have won procedural advantages in foreclosure proceedings that debtors' lawyers
have been unable to redress); see also Cathryn Miller-Wilson, Harmonizing Current
Threats: Using the Outcry for Legal Education Reforms to Take Another Look at 
Civil
Gideon and What It Means to be an American Lawyer, 13 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION,
GENDER & CLASS 49, 64 n.48 (2013).
112. The Unmet Need for Legal Aid, LEGAL SERVICES CORP., https://www.1sc.gov/what-
legal-aidl/unmet-need-legal-aid (last visited Oct. 31, 2018) ("Nearly a million poor people
who seek help for civil legal problems are turned away because of the lack of adequate
resources.").
113. See Terri Gerstein & Sharon Block, Opinion, Ending the Dead-End-Job Trap, N.Y.
TIMES (July 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/12/opinionlfast-food-dead-end-
job-trap.html (describing how stvte attorneys general are filling in the worker-protection
role that workers' own lawyers would do if they could afford to).
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Increasing the socioeconomic diversity of the bar would likely
increase the number of lawyers motivated to take on these clients.114 But
the broader sense that too many lawyers are competing for too few
(paying) legal jobs has led to calls for increasing the difficulty of passing
the bar examination.115 Even defenders of the bar examination agree that
it replicates the racial disparities present earlier in the pipeline: law
school admissions, LSAT scores, college graduation rates, and SAT
scores.116 Critics of the current structure of the bar exam go further,
arguing that it exacerbates racial inequity and worsens the
underrepresentation of people of color in the legal profession.117 And, as
already noted, underrepresentation at the bar correlates with lower
access to attorneys for clients from those underrepresented racial and
ethnic groups.118
Wherever one falls along the spectrum of opinion on this issue, it
should be clear that a large and growing pool of clients who cannot afford
lawyers is not a separate question from the problem of law school
enrollment and bar admissions. An economist would characterize the
current debate around law schools and low bar passage rates as
addressing the problem of supply. But the problem of demand is just as
pressing: How can we increase the access of indigent and otherwise
marginalized communities to competent lawyers?119 Some part of that
discussion must include a reconsideration of whether the bar exam is
effective at testing what we need it to test and how raising the required
scores would affect these vulnerable client communities.
And what is the appropriate institution of government to carry out
that reconsideration? State high courts and the relevant commissions
and committees of the state judiciary that report to them have
well-established authority in this area. For example, in a Connecticut
case from 1961, the state high court considered whether a New York
lawyer who had not graduated from a law school could still be admitted
114. See Paula Lustbader, Painting Beyond the Numbers: The Art of Providing Inclusive
Law School Admission to Ensure Full Representation in the Profession, 40 CAP. U. L. REV.
71, 79-82 (2012) (describing the benefits of a diverse bar); Eli Wald, A Primer on Diversity,
Discrimination, and Equality in the Legal Profession or Who is Responsible for Pursuing
Diversity and Why, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1079, 1102-03 (2011) (same).
115. See William C. Kidder, The Bar Examination and the Dream Deferred: A Critical
Analysis of the MBE, Social Closure, and Racial and Ethnic Stratification, 29 L. & Soc.
INQUIRY 547, 555-58 (2004).
116. See Lustbader, supra note 114, at 81-82.
117. See id. at 564-65, 569-82.
118. Id. at 566.
119. See generally Miller-Wilson, supra note 111, at 49 (advocating for the
implementation of "teaching law firms" to solve the related problems of access to legal
education and access to legal services).
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to the Connecticut bar-as a statute would have permitted-or was
properly denied admission-as court rules required.
120 The court held
without hesitation and without dissent that only the judiciary could set
the qualifications for attorneys.
121 This result followed from an analysis
of the constitutional practice in other states, the early English and
colonial practice, and the legislative history of the constitution; all of
those sources pointed in the same direction.
122
This structural allocation of power means that, instead of the
horse-trading, logrolling, and grandstanding associated with legislative
decision-making, citizens can expect the relatively collegial, learned, and
deliberate lawmaking of the judiciary. Even politically unpopular
outcomes are feasible for a court focused on the long-term good of the
commonwealth. The judges and justices responsible for regulating
admission to the bar can-and should-set policy not just in light of the
economic self-interest of the professional guild, but what maximizes
access to law for our society's most vulnerable populations.
V. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAUSES PROTECT THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
CERTAIN CIVIL ACTIONS
Determining who gets to be a lawyer has significant consequences for
who has access to a lawyer. But state courts, thanks to the structural
choices inscribed in their constitutions, have an even more direct way of
increasing access to justice: by establishing a right to counsel for certain
important rights.123 Although often called "civil Gideon," the concept
actually embraces several distinct approaches to solving the "justice gap,"
the divide between indigent clients who need lawyers and lawyers who
can afford to take on those clients.
124 Some advocates propose a statutory
scheme, perhaps keyed to a dedicated tax; some propose a relaxation of
the standards limiting the unauthorized practice of law to authorize
lower-cost, lesser-trained legal advisers; some urge dramatically
expanding pro bono requirements for attorneys, who would be assigned
civil cases by the courts; some focus attention on federal constitutional
claims; and some simply support higher public support for legal aid
organizations. But another approach centers on using state court
litigation to press claims founded on state constitutional principles,
120. Heiberger v. Clark, 169 A.2d 652, 654-55 (Conn. 1961).
121. Id. at 659.
122. Id. at 657-59.
123. Tonya L. Brito et al., What We Know and Need to Know About Civil Gideon, 67 S.C.
L. REV. 223, 225 (2016).
124. See, e.g., id. at 223-225.
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resulting in a right to counsel in the most high-stakes civil cases directly
comparable to the right to counsel in criminal cases established in the
original Gideon.125
The contours of such a right would naturally vary from state to state.
But the most promising areas of law for the establishment of a civil right
to counsel would be those touching on core features of a person's identity.
For example, in a Montana case, the state supreme court considered a
mother who had her parental rights terminated without benefit of
counsel.126 Using the state constitution's equal protection clause to rise
above the federal floor, the court held that the parent's statutory
entitlement to an attorney in an abuse/neglect proceeding must also be
applied where her parental rights were involuntarily terminated in an
adoption proceeding.127 Upon determining that the right to parent is
fundamental, the court applied a "strict scrutiny" standard of review-a
federal notion commonly applied in a state constitutional context.128 The
opinion did not engage in any federal analysis, except to note that the
question is "open" under the Federal Constitution; following Michigan v.
Long, which permits the U.S. Supreme Court to review state courts'
constitutional decisions unless the state court makes explicit that its
decision rests on state-law grounds, the court concluded its opinion with
a clear statement that the decision rested independently on state
grounds.129 Furthermore, the court did not make any reference
whatsoever to unique Montana factors. Unapologetically, the court
interpreted its own equal protection clause according to its own best
understanding and in doing so diverged from federal doctrine, thereby
guaranteeing access to justice for indigent parents during the trauma of
termination proceedings.
Other state constitutional bases for civil Gideon might include the
state due process clauses,130 state clauses guaranteeing a right to a
remedy,131 "open courts" clauses,132 and even the inherent power of the
courts to operate fairly. In addition to parental rights, other areas of law
that appear promising for expansion of the right to counsel under state
constitutions include evictions, adoption, foreclosure, public benefits, and
125. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). See generally Steven D. Schwinn,
Faces of Open Courts and the Civil Right to Counsel, 37 BALT. L. REV. 21 (2007).
126. J.N.S. v. A.W. (In re Adoption of A.W.S. & K.R.S.), 2014 MT 322, ¶ 1, 377 Mont.
234, 339 P.3d 414, 415.
127. Id. at $T 22-26, n.2, 339 P.3d at 418-19, n.2.
128. Id. at TT 16-17, 339 P.3d at 417.
129. Id. at T 27, 339 P.3d at 420.
130. See, e.g., Schwinn, supra note 125, at 22-24.
131. Id. at 35-38.
132. See generally id.
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even consumer debt collection.1
33 Just as with the right to counsel in
criminal cases, financial support for this expansion of access to civil
justice could come from some combination of public appropriation at 
the
state and/or local level. If the compensation scale were insufficient to
attract enough lawyers, courts could use their power to regulate the bar
to assign lawyers involuntarily,
134 as they sometimes do in the criminal
context.135 Because of the close link between access to an attorney and
the proper functioning of the courts,
136 state judiciaries would likely be
near the zenith of their power to order appropriate funding for the
programs.
VI. STATE COURTS HAVE CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO SECURE THEIR
OWN FUNCTIONALITY
Many judges who are otherwise sympathetic to a vigorous protection
of the judiciary's powers under the state constitutions seem to quaver at
the problem of enforcement. For example, in the famous de facto school
desegregation case from Connecticut, Sheff v. O'Neill, the state supreme
court issued a strong and quite controversial decision ordering the
legislature to desegregate the Hartford schools.
137 But the command
included no express sticks or carrots, and indeed, the legislature had to
be sued two more times before the rudiments of compliance became
visible.
138
It can sometimes seem that judges perceive themselves to be part of
the team, an arm of the state meant to smooth over legal problems rather
than serve as a check on the political branches' more audacious policy
ambitions. And the struggle to devise appropriate yet effective
enforcement mechanisms has yet to be won. After all, no court can just
put all the legislators in jail for civil contempt if they fail to pass an
appropriation. But a strong judiciary is not possible without strong
enforcement powers, and some courts have found creative ways to protect
133. See Brito et al., supra note 123, at 223-24, 233, 237.
134. An example of courts' power to regulate the bar occurred in Persels & Associates 
v.
Banking Commissioner, when the Connecticut Supreme Court invalidated, on 
state
constitutional grounds, a statute purporting to authorize the Banking Commissioner 
to
regulate attorneys engaged in debt negotiation in lieu of the judiciary's relevant 
attorney
regulations. The court held that only the courts could define the obligations of 
holding a
law license. 122 A.3d 592, 607 (Conn. 2015).
135. This is possible because of the lawyers' duty under widely adopted rules of
professional responsibility. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 6.2 (AM. BAR. Ass'N,
amended 2018) (noting a lawyer's obligation to accept assignments with noted exceptions).
136. See, e.g., Schwinn, supra note 125, at 55-58.
1-17. 678 A.2d 1267, 1270-71, 1290 (Conn. 1996).
138. See Long, supra note 19, at 290-96.
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the rule of law without fomenting debilitating backlash or sinking into
popular disdain and illegitimacy.
The first line in the sand in defending the judiciary's prerogatives is
the funding of the courts themselves. Access to justice for the injured and
the wronged is meaningless if dockets are too large for timely
proceedings, judges' working conditions are too Spartan to support
careful decision-making, or resources are granted and withheld
politically to undermine judicial independence. In Pennsylvania, the
state supreme court issued one of the most assertive decisions anywhere
to protect the basic functioning of the judiciary.139 Certain trial-level
courts there are funded not by the state legislature but by local units of
government. In the midst of a profound fiscal crisis of its own, the City of
Philadelphia appropriated more than 15 percent less to the local state
courts than they had requested in an already bare-bones budget.140 The
judges sued.141
When the case ultimately reached the top of the state judiciary, the
supreme court was thoroughly convinced that the appropriations
approved for the support of the Philadelphia court were grossly
insufficient.142 Turning to the constitutional question, the supreme court
concluded that by creating courts, the constitution empowered those
same courts to demand sufficient funding to operate.143 In other words,
the courts had an inherent power to insist on a certain basic level of
funding below which they could not carry out their constitutional
obligations.144 The supreme court ordered the Philadelphia municipal
legislature to fund the courts, despite the many other serious demands
on its treasury.145
More recently, in New York, the state high court also ordered the
political branches to appropriate money for the courts that the
representatives did not wish to spend. In Maron v. Silver, the New York
Court of Appeals determined that, because of inaction by the legislature,
inflation had diminished the salaries of state judges to such an extent
that the constitutional separation of powers was violated.146 The
legislature had repeatedly approved budgets that included increases in
judicial compensation, but had consistently refused to appropriate the
money allocated in the budget (at least without a concurrent increase in
139. See Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 274 A.2d 193, 199 (Pa. 1971).
140. Id. at 194-195, 199.
141. Id. at 194.
142. Id. at 199-200.
143. Id. at 198-99.
144. Id. at 197.
145. Id. at 199-200.
146. 925 N.E.2d 899, 914-15 (N.Y 2010).
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the legislators' own salaries).1
47 So the judges finally brought a lawsuit
against both houses of the legislature, their leaders, the governor, the
comptroller, and even the court administrator.148 The high court agreed
with the judges, but merely declared the legislature's failure
unconstitutional without issuing an injunction. Instead, the court
concluded its opinion with the line, "[w]e therefore expect appropriate
and expeditious legislative consideration."e
49 The court's decision, it held,
was authorized by its inherent right to interpret the constitution.
50
As in Maron v. Silver and Carroll v. Tate, courts can use their
inherent powers, or extrapolations from their constitutional separation
of powers clauses, to protect their own resources. While no one argued 
in
either case that the judges were making less than a living wage, both sets
of plaintiffs demonstrated concrete effects on the ability of the courts 
to
carry out their functions with a highly qualified bench backed by
sufficient resources to provide just and efficient services.1
5 1
Although neither Maron nor Carroll demonstrated a vigorous judicial
enforcement mechanism to back up what were certainly unpopular
opinions, other examples do show courts holding the legislature to
account. In a 2002 case, the high court of Massachusetts required the
legislature to fund a public campaign-finance program that had passed
by popular initiative over staunch legislative objection.152 When the
legislature simply refused to comply with the court's command, it created
a conundrum. The court could hardly hold the entire legislature in
contempt; some of the members might well have supported the necessary
appropriation.
The court did not want to commit its own violation of separation of
powers by directly appropriating the money or commanding the
Treasurer to pay the fund without appropriation.153 Instead, the
Massachusetts court devised a solution both novel and deeply
traditional: a judicial foreclosure sale. The court vested a single justice
with ongoing jurisdiction to enforce the decree, and that justice started
selling state property.154 She started with surplus equipment from a state
147. Id. at 904-05.
148. Id. at 905.
149. Id. at 915, 917.
150. Id. at 917 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)).
151. Id. at 916-17; Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 274 A.2d 193, 199 (Pa. 1971).
See generally Andrew W. Yates, Note, Using Inherent Judicial Power in a State-Level
Budget Dispute, 62 DUKE L.J. 1463 (2013).
152. See Bates v. Dir. of Office of Campaign & Political Fin., 763 N.E.2d 6, 10-11 (Mass.
2002).
153. See id. at 29.
154. See id. at 30-31; Long, supra note 19, at 302 n.155.
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warehouse, which served only to poke the bear-the legislators got even
angrier, but still did not appropriate the funds. She threatened to sell the
Speaker's office furniture, but still the appropriation was not
forthcoming. Finally, she began the process to sell state land, at which
point the legislators blinked and the appropriation went through.155 The
elegance of this approach is how it blends unyielding insistence that the
court's decree be honored with an ancient and well-understood
enforcement mechanism almost banal in its conventionality. Such an
approach, while inarguably aggressive and thus probably a last-ditch
effort, could guarantee victorious civil litigants dependent on legislative
action that the courts will protect their rights.
VII. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAUSES PROTECT STATE WORKERS
While lawsuits against state officials are typically "civil" in the sense
of not criminal, "civil rights" cases are commonly categorized apart from
private law cases. But the states wear many hats. In addition to their
role as governments, in which they are susceptible to judicial oversight
at the insistence of citizen plaintiffs, states also carry out important
proprietary functions.156 Their performance of these functions subjects
them to many of the same legal burdens shared by other employers,
property owners, and buyers/sellers. Access to civil justice for state
workers is a small subset of the larger problem of vulnerable workers and
their capacity to seek help from the courts, but it is an important subset.
State constitutions play an important part in the employer-employee
relationship between the state and its workers, and they model that
relationship for private employers.
For example, in a recent case from Illinois, the state supreme court
considered that state's constitutional "pension protection clause."57
State constitutions might be mocked for their detail and small-bore
miscellany, but underlying all of that detail.is often a textual expression
of the people's deeply-held values and their grave pessimism about their
elected representatives' ability to live by those values. The states' pension
clauses are a vivid example of this.
155. See Mark C. Miller, Conflicts Between the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
and the Legislature: Campaign Finance Reform and Same-Sex Marriage, 4 PIERCE L. REV.
279, 291 (2006).
156. See generally Michael Wells & Walter Hellerstein, The Governmental-Proprietary
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 66 VA. L. REV. 1073 (1980).
157. Jones v. Municipal Emps.' Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago, 2016 IL 119618, ¶
1, 50 N.E.3d 596, 598.
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State constitutional pension protection clauses often read like they
were written by a computer posing as an accountant pretending to be a
lawyer. Michigan's, for example, says:
The accrued financial benefits of each pension plan and
retirement system of the state and its political subdivisions shall
be a contractual obligation thereof which shall not be diminished
or impaired thereby.
.... Financial benefits arising on account of service rendered
in each fiscal year shall be funded during that year and such
funding shall not be used for financing unfunded accrued
liabilities. 158
The text sounds boring, technical, and about as far away from the
constitutional poetry of "to form a more perfect union" as it is possible to
get.159 In the Illinois case mentioned above, a nearly identical text formed
the basis for a challenge by Chicago public workers to that city's habitual
underfunding of its pension obligations, which in turn led to reduction in
benefits.160 The supreme court expressly rejected financial exigency as an
exception to the clause prohibiting the reduction of benefits, saying that
the constitutional clause would be meaningless if the legislature or local
governments could evade it whenever they saw fit to do so.
161 All
beneficiaries of the pension plan were entitled to their full pensions,
regardless of whether the city or state ultimately bore the financial
burden.1
62
In the recent bankruptcy of Detroit, the state's pension protection
clause would have barred the diminution in pension payments ultimately
endorsed by the federal bankruptcy court. That result was only possible
because of the Supremacy Clause, which privileges the requirements of
the Federal Bankruptcy Code over even constitution-level state law.
163
These obscure clauses, directly affecting only government workers,
apply to civil justice more broadly in at least two ways. First, they
demonstrate the considered judgment of the people of the state that the
protection of promised employee benefits is a virtue, and a virtue of such
significance that it deserves constitutional expression. This creates
158. MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 24.
159. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
160. Jones, 2016 IL 119618, at ¶ 4, 50 N.E.3d at 598 (quoting ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 5
(2007)).
161. Id. at ¶ 47, 50 N.E.3d at 607-08.
162. Id. at 1 43, 50 N.E.3d at 606-07.
163. See In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 150, 161 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013).
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opportunities for argument by analogy in protecting workers' rights
against private employers. Second, the constitutional protections for
state workers are really a protection for the state itself. By promoting the
recruitment and retention of highly qualified workers, these clauses help
protect the power of the state.
Each state carries out the responsibilities of sovereignty through the
hands of its workers. When it comes to whose hands are guarding against
unreasonable hazards in private workplaces, assuring the quality of
healthcare facilities, or licensing professionals to protect the public,
ordinary people rely on state employees. The state constitutions'
protection of those workers helps solve many of the problems before
tragedy strikes or litigation ensues. Even when private malfeasance does
lead to litigation, the expertise and experience of the state workforce can
lead to evidence that allows injured parties to meet their burden of proof.
VII. STATE CONSTITUTIONS EMPOWER STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL
Among the state workers crucial to protecting the public and its
access to justice are the states' top law officers, the attorneys general
("AGs"). As with so many of the other areas I discuss in this paper, there
are major differences between the state AGs and their federal
counterparts-and those differences rarely get sufficient attention from
the bench and bar. First, all but seven of the states have independently
elected attorneys general; they report directly to the people, not the
governors.164 State AGs also derive their authority directly from state
constitutions, not by delegation from the governors. And they have broad
164. Alaska, Hawaii, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Tennessee, and Wyoming have
Attorneys General appointed by the Governor. See ALASKA STAT. § 44.23.010 (1962); HAW.
CONST. art. V, § 6; N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. 46; N.J. CONST. art. V, § 4; TENN. CONST. art. VI,
§ 5; WYo. STAT. ANN. § 9-1-601 (2013). In Maine, the Attorney General is elected by the
legislature. See ME. CONST. art. IX, § 11. All other states have direct elections, as
established either by state constitution or statute. See ALA. CONST. art. V, § 114; ARIZ.
CONST. art. V, § 1; ARK. CONST. art. VI, § 3; CAL. CONST. art. V, § 11; COLO. CONST. art. IV,§ 3; CONN. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (amended 1970); DEL. CONST. art. III, § 21; FLA. CONST. art.
IV, § 5; GA. CONST. art. V, § 3; IDAHO CONST. art. IV, §§ 1-2; ILL. CONST. art. V, § 1; IND.
CODE § 4-6-1-2 (2013); IOWA CONST. art. V, § 12; KAN. CONST. art. I, § 1; KY. CONST. § 93;
LA. CONST. ANN. art. IV, § 3 (2006); MD. CONST. art. V, § 1; MASS. CONST. amend. art. XVII;
MICH. CONST. art. V, § 21; MINN. CONST. art. V, § 1; MISS. CONST. art. VI, § 173; Mo. CONST.
art. TV, § 17; MONT. CONST. art. VI, § 2; NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. V, § 19;
N.M. CONST. art. V, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. V, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. III, § 7; N.D. CONsT. art.
V, § 2; OHIO CONST. art. III, § 1; OKLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4; OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 180.02
(West 2007); PA. CONST. art. IV, § 4.1; R.I. CONST. art. IV, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. VI, § 7; S.D.
CONST. art. IV, § 7; TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 1-2; UTAH CONST. art. XXIV, § 12; VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. III, § 151 (2010); VA. CONST. art. V, § 15; WASH. CONST. art. III, § 1; W. VA. CONST. art.
VII, § 2; WIS. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
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common law powers, inherited from early England, to pursue cases
independently of the executive branch.
165 Some AGs have both civil and
criminal authority, while some have only civil authority.
166 All AGs have
regulatory power as well as enforcement power; areas subject to attorney
general regulation typically include non-profit organizations (for 
which
the AGs serve functionally as shareholders), certain insurance matters,
protection of people who lack legal capacity, and public bonding. 
All AGs
serve as both state counsel (advising agencies formally and informally,
helping with their transactions, and defending them in court) and 
as the
people's advocate (litigating on behalf of the public, without any
particular state agency as a client).
One of the more distinctive powers of state AGs, a power that
would be quite alien to those immersed in the federal system, is their
common-law parens patriae authority.
167 This ancient power (again,
derived from merry old England),
166 vests the AGs with the power to
bring actions on behalf of the people. No state agency need be involved,
and no governor's or legislature's permission is required.
169 The doctrine
typically permits the state AG to bring an action even if no one else would
have standing, such as for aesthetic injuries, dignitary injuries, harm to
inaccessible areas of state land,
170 or simply legal violations causing
injuries too diffuse for any private individual to hold standing.
171 And
these actions can be brought on behalf of the people of the state, not the
state itself-parens patriae authority is distinct from litigation on behalf
of the state government in its proprietary capacity.
172
165. See Jim Ryan & Don R. Sampen, Suing on Behalf of the State: A Parens 
Patriae
Primer, 86 ILL. B.J. 684, 684 (1998).
166. The New York Attorney General pursues both criminal and civil litigation. 
See
Divisions, N.Y. ST. OFF. ATT'Y GEN., https://ag.ny.gov/bureaus (last visited Oct. 31, 2018).
Connecticut, on the other hand, has independent prosecutors selected 
by a special
commission to preserve their independence from politics. CONN. CONST. art. 1V (amended
1984). The Attorney General has no criminal law enforcement authority. CONN. 
GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 3-125 (West).
167. See Ryan & Sampen, supra note 165, at 685-87.
168. See generally Green v. Allen, 24 Tenn. (5 Hum.) 170, 198-203 (1844) (describing the
English origins of the doctrine).
169. See, e.g., In re S.G., 677 N.E.2d 920, 928 (1997).
170. See generally Allan Kanner, The Public Trust Doctrine, Parens Patriae, and 
the
Attorney General as The Guardian of the State's Natural Resources, 16 DUKE ENVTL. L. 
&
POL'Y F. 57, 59, 100-12 (2005).
171. See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel, State Standing in Climate Change Lawsuits, 26 J. 
LAND
USE & ENvTL. L. 217, 227-30 (2011).
172. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 258-59, 264-65 (1972)
(distinguishing between the state's cause of action in its proprietary capacity based 
on the
state government's direct losses and its parens patriae cause of action on behalf 
of its
citizens injured by the misconduct).
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The tobacco litigation initiated by Mississippi's Attorney General on
behalf of the people of his state stands as the most important and
successful exercise of parens patriae authority. The Mississippi v.
American Tobacco Master Settlement Agreementl73 stands as a shining
example of the use by attorneys general of extraordinary powers to
recover for losses to both the states themselves as proprietors and their
people. Private class actions could never have accomplished the same
comprehensive remedy. Other state AGs followed suit, using
Mississippi's model.174 And once the state's victory was on the books,
private plaintiffs could and did pile on, suing the tobacco companies with
the legal theories and factual evidence already developed by the
attorneys general.175
In this way, preserving the strong, albeit vague, constitutional
powers of the state attorneys general can have positive effects on access
to civil justice. Injured parties who might not have been able to afford
attorneys, or whose claims fell below the threshold of economic viability,
could (and did) finally win redress for their injuries by piggy-backing on
the states' litigation.176 Even if the efficiency of issue preclusion is not
available to private litigants piling on after the state AGs' victories, the
simple knowledge of the facts uncovered in discovery in the states'
litigation offers private attorneys an easier path forward against
otherwise daunting defendants.177
And what justifies this extraordinary set of powers, including the
parens patriae power, for a state AG? In contrast to the federal model,
state AGs are almost all elected.178 Their power comes directly from the
people, and that leaves a direct political check on their offices.179 Notably,
the political check does not come from gubernatorial oversight; governors
173. Master Settlement Agreement, Mississippi v. American Tobacco, No. 1:94-cv-00293
(S.D. Miss. 1998), https://web.archive.org/web/20080625084126/http://www.naag.org/
backpages/naag/tobacco/msalmsa-pdf/I 109185724_1032468605 cigmsa.pdf;
see also Gregory W. Traylor, Note, Big Tobacco, Medicaid-Covered Smokers, and the
Substance of the Master Settlement Agreement, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1081, 1095-1101 (2010)
(discussing the economic and regulatory terms of the Master Settlement Agreement).
174. See generally Peter Pringle, The Chronicles of Tobacco: An Account of the Forces
That Brought the Tobacco Industry to the Table, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 387 (1999)
(describing how other states followed Mississippi's lead in suing the tobacco
manufacturers).
175. See id. at 387-88, 391-94.
176. See id. at 394-95.
177. Cf. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331-33 (1979) (allowing
non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel where the investor-plaintiffs benefitted from facts
determined in a prior action by the SEC against the same corporate defendant).
178. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
179. See Engel, supra note 171, at 236.
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cannot hire, fire, or command their own attorneys general.
180 This creates
the possibility for one of the least intellectually interesting but 
most
practically important powers a state AG can possess: the right 
not to
litigate. By and large, state attorneys general tend to take seriously 
their
obligations as the state government's lawyer, and they are typically quite
professional about offering zealous advocacy on behalf of defendant 
state
agencies even when the AG would decide the policy matter differently
from the agency. But the exceptions-when AGs decide they can no
longer defend a statute or state agency action--can create a major impact
on the disputed legal question. For example, the California attorney
general's decision not to defend that state's same-sex marriage 
ban
simultaneously weakened the defense of the statute in court and signaled
to the public that the ban was likely to fail. That signal energized the
ban's opponents and prepared the ban's defenders for the legal, political,
and cultural loss that soon came their way.
181
IX.STATE CONSTITUTIONS EMPOWER STATE AGENCIES
While state AGs can use their authority to protect the public,
especially as the availability of class actions continues to decline,
182 state
agencies can also use relatively unusual constitutional powers to 
create
the conditions necessary for expanded access to justice.
Many states have specialized agencies that are functionally outside
of the executive branch; the state constitutions have imbued them with
independent authority. For example, in Michigan, the three most
prominent public universities are each overseen by boards granted
express authority over university policy by the state constitution. 183 The
180. For example, the Maine Attorney General caused the state to join as a plaintiff 
in
an action against federal immigration policy, over the governor's strident opposition. See
Michael Shepherd, LePage Throws Another Legal Jab at Mills as Poll Shows 
Her
Leading in Race to Replace Him, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Oct. 23, 2018, 6:27 AM), https://
bangordaily news.com2018/10/22/politics/1epage-throws-another-legal-jab- at- mills- as- poll-
shows-her-leading-race-to-replace-hi m/ (describing the conflict between constitutional
officers).
181. See Justin Ewers, California Attorney General Jerry Brown Asks Court to Overturn
Prop 8, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Dec. 22, 2008, 2:59 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/
articles/2008/1 2/22/california-attorney-general-jerry-brown-asks-court-to-overturn-prop-8.
See generally Niraj Chokshi, Seven Attorneys General Won't Defend Their Own 
State's
Gay-Marriage Bans, WASH. POST: GovBEAT (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.
w ashingtonpost.comblogs/govbeat/wp/2014/02/20/six-attorneys-general-wont-defend-
their-own-states-gay-marriage-bans.
182. See generally Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV.
729 (2013).
183. See MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 5 (1963).
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board members are directly elected by the people, state-wide.184 As a
result, the legislature can only influence the universities indirectly,
through its appropriations. The boards retain the final say about the kind
of education offered, and the courts have upheld the boards' authority
even in the face of statutory law to the contrary.185 In Florida, the
constitutional drafters were worried that political pressure to expand
harvesting opportunities for hunters and fishers would harm the
environment, so they created a special commission to regulate fish and
wildlife.186 The executive branch agency responsible for natural
resources, the Florida Department of Natural Resources, was directly
accountable to the governor.187 The Florida Supreme Court held that the
constitutional commission's regulations took precedence over the
executive branch regulations;188 an earlier case held that the
commission's regulations also superseded contrary statutes.189
The existence of state agencies with their own direct constitutional
authority, unaccountable to either the governor or legislature legally or
politically, means that marginalized groups without adequate access to
the conventional political system in the legislature may find surprising
opportunities to influence policy in more congenial fora. These
independent agencies might conduct their work in a way that treats
righting civil wrongs as a higher priority than the conventional branches
do. They might also adopt regulatory policies that protect consumers, the
environment, students, or other politically weak classes more strongly
than do the legislatures. And their enforcement methods-their
inspections, investigations, and litigation-can expose wrongdoing that
then invites private parties to pursue their own remedies in the civil
justice system. Judicial protection for the autonomy and authority of
these independent constitutional agencies can help to create alternative
spaces for debate, open new opportunities for marginalized groups, and
empower bolder protection for society's vulnerable members.
X. CONCLUSION
Each constitutional structure described in this paper affects how
injured parties can-or cannot-obtain relief in the state courts. Access
to justice depends on more than acknowledgment of the appropriate
184. See MICH. COMP. LAws § 168.286 (1963).
185. See Sterling v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 68 N.W. 253, 256-57 (Mich. 1896).
186. See FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 9 (1998).
187. FLA. STAT. § 20.255 (2018) (creating the Department).
188. Fla. Dep't of Nat. Res. v. Fla. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm'n, 342 So. 2d 495,
497 (Fla. 1977).
189. Whitehead v. Rogers, 223 So. 2d 330, 331 (Fla. 1969) (per curiam).
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cause of action. Real access to justice requires institutions of government
with the power and incentives to give meaning to that cause of action, to
assure that litigants get fair treatment and have democratic access 
to the
state officials who make the rules.
Ultimately, within every personal injury or similar civil action, there
is the seed of a constitutional claim. Every claim is an assertion 
that the
courts have power to redress that injury; that the legal violation 
derives
its applicability from a legitimate law-making institution; and that state
officials stand willing and able to enforce the law. These 
state
constitutional questions, implicit in every case, can be brought out into
the open by skilled advocates and learned judges. Sometimes what look
like even the most ordinary cases will end up turning on deep questions
about the structure of state government. And when these cases, which
first arrived in a lawyer's office looking like a run-of-the-mill personal
injury case, get translated into legal discourse as separation-of-powers
claims or justiciability claims, they can shift how power is allocated
across the state. They can inspire new-maybe odd-alliances, where
judges who would normally be skeptical of the cause of action stand
strong against intrusions on judicial authority. And these civil actions
turned structure-of-government cases can alter the state's democratic
accountability, opening new avenues of influence for communities who
would otherwise be shut out of political discussion and decision-making.
Most, if not all, of the particular structures I describe in this paper
have no analogue in the federal system. They may seem strange to
lawyers who are trained in federal law-centered law schools and to 
a
public immersed in federal-law rhetoric. But at least by volume, 
it is
these distinctive state arrangements that constitute the normal
American practice; and it is the federal system that is strange. To
preserve access to justice for the indigent and marginalized, state courts
must insist on the preservation of these constitutional arrangements.
Where state constitutional text does something startling, like give an
agency power over fishing licenses that exceeds the legislature's, state
courts must resist the temptation to read the constitutional text as if 
it
were federal, with the federal presumptions and the federal limitations.
State courts must embrace the weirdness of their own constitutions.
To do that best, state courts must first and foremost protect
themselves. Rather than seeing themselves as team players with
responsibility for papering over whatever policy choices the political
branches make, state judiciaries can draw confidence from their
constitutions. Looking at the structural arrangements described in this
paper and the rest of the constitutional institutions and their incentives,
state courts can come to the appropriate conclusion that state
constitutional drafters and ratifiers have never viewed their legislatures
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and governors as worthy of excessive deference. The constitutions are
jammed with quiet expressions of distrust in the political officials of the
states. Bold, self-confident judiciaries can stand up for the ratifiers of
state constitutions-the people themselves-by holding the other
institutions of government to account. Doing so will, in turn, protect
access to civil justice and the courts' own legitimacy as the best place to
find that justice. The constitutional texts contain plenty of reason for
state courts to assert themselves. All that the people ask is for judges
who will give these texts their due.

